Lucky Poland

When one looks at Polish history and politics, the word “lucky” is not the one that naturally comes to mind. To the contrary, one tends to thinks of Poland as a country cursed by its geographical location and whose history, since at least XVIth century, is a long suite of calamities and disasters. This is in part due to a deeply ingrained political tradition, which combines constant bickering with verbal grandstanding and ideological posturing, resulting in chronic instability and occasionally in major tragedies such as the successive partitions of Poland at the end of XVIIIth century and the subsequent loss of independence until 1918. Poles have a special word for this tradition: “warcholstwo” which can be translated as acute factiousness.
Not surprisingly, when the Communist interval ended in 1989, polish politics reverted to the familiar pattern: not a single government lasted more than one term, political parties rose, fell and changed spots amidst a cacophony of recriminations, accusations and anathema. Yet, this time around, Poland got lucky: “warcholstwo” did not trigger any serious economic or political consequences. Quite the reverse, since 1989, Poland has managed an exemplary, by standards of outside observers, transition to an open market economy, became one of the pillars of NATO and joined the European Union. And by all accounts, including that of committed Polish eurosceptics, EU entry has been unequivocally and broadly beneficial to the Polish economy.
One may attribute the Polish success since 1989 to two factors. First, for once Poland found herself in the right place at the right time. Placed between the crumbling East Germany and the disintegrating Soviet Union, Poland appeared as an anchor of stability and Western countries saw it as a showcase of successful transition. The second, more intangible, factor was the presence of John Paul II. I discussed in another blog the critical role of the Polish pope in the overall history of the second half of XXth century. For Poland, his role was even more important. Not only was he the spiritual guide of the nation but he also provided a strong sense of unity and did not hesitate to intervene personally when political bickering threatened to spill over into broader social arena.

Pope died in April 2005. But so far Polish luck appears to hold, despite a sustained effort of a large segment of political classes to test it, particularly since the last legislative and presidential elections in September and October 2005.These elections led to the political victory of Kaczynski twins, right-wing political duo, whose professed model is the Bavarian Christian Democratic Union (CSU). One twin, Lech, was elected President of Poland, while PiS, the party chaired by the other (Jaroslaw) became the largest group in the new Parliament. However, PiS did not win outright majority and thus had to find a coalition partner. It is then that things became complicated. The 'natural' partner was another right-center party, PO, which came second in the parliamentary election. This result was quite unexpected, including by PiS, which was widely seen as a junior partner, primary interested in internal law and order rather in a broader mission of steering Poland toward modernity and greater global integration. In the new political context, PO did not appear ready to swap roles with PiS and play junior partner. PiS - PO talks broke down in the torrent of recriminations and PO became the bulwark of the opposition. PiS set up a government on its own, with many critical ministerial post filled by non-political technicians and headed not by the party chairman but by a reasonably consensual (by Polish standards) politician, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz. As the Polish political system is a parliamentary one, practically all government proposals have to be approved by the Parliament. This proved to be quite challenging. Opposition to the governing party might have been highly heterogeneous, from the post-Communists through various shades of center to the extreme Right, but as a result of this variety, every government proposal was simultaneously criticized as too profligate and too skimpy and either shot down or loaded with undesirable extras. Parliamentary debates degenerated into nerve-wrecking and frustrating marathons and psychodramas. This is nothing new in Polish politics. However, since 2004 there is a major change in the policy context: because of the EU membership, the government and the Parliament operate within a set of constraints, both legislative and budgetary, which further limited government’s freedom of maneuver. EU membership also means that the government has to take positions on a number of transborder issues. In this domain, it consistently adopted a stand of independence, bordering on defiance. It threatened to veto a deal on lower VAT rates in January and it opposed a takeover of a German bank by an Italian one, which would result in Italian bank in Poland absorbing another bank and increasing its market share. These actions plus few off-handed statements about the need to preserve the national character of the Polish economy and the clear reticence of the new President toward gay right activists was enough to convince international medias such as Financial Times, Figaro, the Economist or CNBC that Poland fell into the hands of backward eurosceptics. In the case of EU policy, this view proved unwarranted. Poles acted tough not because of an atavistic attachment to saber-rattling but simply because this is a time-tested strategy for newcomers to gain seat at the EU table, which has been practiced with great success by France, UK, Spain and Greece, among others Despite tough rhetoric, Poland never went over the edge and settled for compromises, which were deemed reasonable by all parties concerned.

In the case of internal political situation, foreign medias may have a point. It was true that in order to get its proposals through the Parliament, the government had to increasingly rely on the support of two fringe parties, Samoobrona (Self-defense) and LPR (League of Polish families). Samoobrona is a rabble-rousing populist grouping, which has its roots in the Polish countryside and defends the interests of all the “left behind.” Led by Andrzej Lepper, who used to be a boxer, Samoobrona does not shirk from verbal and sometimes physical violence. Lepper and his colleagues have been condemned several times by Polish courts for assaults and slander, which made them strange fellow travelers to a party, which calls itself, “Law and Justice” and want to promote moral renewal of polity and society. LPR is a linear descendant of the National Democratic (ND) tradition: its chairman Roman Giertych is a grandson of a principal adviser to the founder of ND, Roman Dmowski (1864 – 1939). LPR is traditionalist, deeply intolerant, rabidly anti-Semitic and selectively xenophobic, distrustful of the West, particularly of Germany, but slavophile and pro-Russian. Both parties strongly and vociferously opposed joining the EU. Since the accession, Samoobrona changed somewhat its position, as Polish farmers emerged as main beneficiaries of EU market opening. However, its rhetoric toward Brussels remains as aggressive, even insulting as ever. It did not help its international image when one of its euro-deputies was charged with assault on a prostitute in Brussels. LPR, for its part, persists in its euro-hostility.

As the level of warcholstwo kept rising in the first months of 2006, mainstream Polish media became increasingly concerned about its impact on Poland's international standing and economic performance. On the economic front, fears appear unfounded so far. Since the arrival of the new government, the economic growth has accelerated and is likely to touch 5% in 2006. Broad consensus is that, barring a major disaster, it should continue at a similar rate in the next few years. More tellingly, financial markets appear supportive. Stock indices are going from record to record and the Polish currency continues to appreciate. If anything, many economists believe that the zloty is overvalued (and some probably secretly wish for more irresponsible statements from government officials).

On the political front, it is again a question of luck, of the right timing. Polish politics, as strange and shameful they might appear to judges of public opinion, do not stand out relative to other EU countries. Warcholstwo appears to be contagious. For instance, Polish press widely anticipated that Polish government will be publicly called to order at the EU summit last March. But whatever criticisms the Commission might have had against Poland, they were instantly eclipsed by Chirac's outburst and walk-out in reaction to a French industrialist’s temerity to make a speech in English.

Who is going to bother about a strange pronouncement by a Polish politician, when French government stumbles from crisis to crisis and English government appears to crumble under a combined weight of incompetence and sex scandals?

However, Polish situation continues to evolve inexorably and the ruling party has now crossed another threshold. After months of informal flirting with Samo-obrona and LPR, PIS tacticians came to the conclusion that the only alternative to new elections, which may again prove inconclusive, was to invite the two parties to join the government in a formal coalition. In early May, the agreement was concluded and both Lepper and Giertych became vice-Prime Ministers. Samo-obrona was given portfolios of agriculture and labor, LPR, that of primary and secondary education.

To say the least, the new coalition was not greeted with universal approval. PiS politicians somewhat bashfully explained that they had no choice and that the major policies would not change: Poland would remain the pillar of NATO and pull its weight within the EU. The mainstream Polish press was dismayed and expressed feelings ranging from anger, to embarrassment and shame. The EU press widely echoed those opinions and deemed the event important enough to warrant editorials. The one by Le Monde, dated May 7/8. 2006, was quite typical. Entitled "Danger in Poland", it criticized heavily the new Polish government, which it compared to Austrian’s decision in 2000 to let the extreme right led by Jorge Heider into the government. It concluded, with obvious regret, that, contrary to the reactions to this decision by other EU countries, which were quite vocal and included partial ostracizing of Austrian officials, Poland is likely to get away without any overt blame.

It remains to be seen whether the newly found Polish luck will persist. This will largely depend on the further evolution of political situation, which I see as more open than the mainstream pessimists believe. The new coalition may crumble in the next few months, precipitating new elections. Yet, many observers believe that it may last for several years, until the next scheduled elections in 2009. A more important question is whether the new coalition will stimulate the rise of ‘warcholstwo’ to new levels of self-destructive posturing or whether it will actually contribute to the necessary modernization of Polish politics. It should be remembered that the widely criticized decision by François Mitterand to invite Communists to join his government in 1981 actually led to a durable decline of Communism in France. As an old saying goes, “Keep your friends close, and your enemies even closer.”